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Football match in the "city of the dead": how the besieged Leningrad proved to be alive. The brightest events in the history of the Moscow stadium "Dynamo 1942" Dynamo stadium that was planted

Advice
11.12.2020

Traditionally, on Saturdays, we publish for you the answers to the quiz in the Q&A format. Our questions are very different, both simple and quite complex. The quiz is very interesting and quite popular, but we just help you test your knowledge and make sure that you have chosen the correct answer from the four suggested. And we have another question in the quiz - What was planted in large numbers in 1942 on the football field of the Moscow Dynamo stadium?

  • Tulips
  • Potatoes
  • Corn

Correct answer C. POTATO

The technique of the blockade game was also special: the players did not run across the field, but played pass, with short passes in order to save energy and hold out until the end of the game, since there were no substitutions.

Another peculiarity was that the Dynamo stadium, like any vacant piece of land in the city that spring, was used for vegetable gardens, and in May the first sprouts of potatoes appeared. To save them, the players agreed not to kick the ball out of the field.

Even the shelling that happened that day did not interfere with the match, during which 228 shells were fired through the city. At the alarm signal, the participants of the match and the fans - soldiers from the nearest hospital - went into the shelter, but as soon as the shelling was over, the athletes again took to the field. After the game ended with the victory of Dynamo 7: 3, the players left the field in an embrace.

Good evening, dear readers of the Sprint-Answer website. Today we have September 2, 2017, which means that the popular TV game "Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?" Is on the air of Channel One. This article provides an overview of the game, as well as all the answers in today's game "Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?" for 09/02/2017.

The first part of the game involves a polygraph examiner-profiler Sabina Pantus and presenter Dmitry Shepelev ... The players chose a fireproof amount of 400,000 rubles.

1. What does a catfish have?

  • mustache
  • beard
  • whiskers
  • dreadlocks

2. What is another name for a zipper?

  • boa
  • snake
  • crocodile
  • dragon

3. Who is Kuzya from the tale of Tatyana Alexandrova?

  • water
  • goblin
  • bannik
  • brownie

4. Which actress in 2003 unexpectedly gave a name to a musical group?

  • Cameron Diaz
  • Uma Thurman
  • Julia Roberts
  • Penelope Cruz

5. What kind of renovation does the old house need?

  • mortgage
  • capital
  • savings
  • accumulative

6. What is the name of the cut-off piece of clothing?

  • yoke
  • fluffy
  • covetous
  • damsel

7. In which country was the escudo currency used before the euro changeover?

  • Luxembourg
  • Belgium
  • Spain
  • Portugal

8. Which beetle was sacred to the ancient Egyptians?

  • may
  • swimmer
  • bark beetle
  • dung

9. What is the name of the central square of Amsterdam, on which the royal palace is located?

  • Amsterdam
  • Ladies
  • Nieder

10. What color is missing on a classic dart board?

  • white
  • red
  • blue
  • green

11. As the creators of "Victory" originally wanted to name the car?

  • "Volga"
  • "Moscow"
  • "Homeland"

12. What poet did the hero of the film "Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears" call "a very promising guy"?

  • Evgenia Evtushenko
  • Robert Rozhdestvensky
  • Andrey Voznesensky
  • Bulata Okudzhava

Unfortunately, the players answered incorrectly to the twelfth question, so they left the game "Who wants to be a millionaire?" no winnings. The second part of the TV game was attended by Evelina Bledans and Ekaterina Gordon ... The participants in the game chose a fireproof amount of 400,000 rubles.

1. What do drivers call a car parking brake?

  • handbrake
  • scissor
  • scissor
  • needy

2. Who rode a broomstick in Chukovsky's fairy tale "Cockroach"?

  • janitor
  • toad
  • witch
  • Harry Potter

3. What is not included in the personal emergency equipment for an air passenger?

  • chair straps
  • parachute
  • oxygen mask
  • inflatable vest

4. What question is usually not expected to be answered?

  • on delicate
  • for the exam
  • to rhetorical
  • to the question bluntly

5. What is the bombniere for?

  • for jewelry
  • for cigars
  • for money
  • for sweets

6. How did the Shooting Manual prescribe the storage of rifles in the guardroom?

  • in the pyramid
  • in the tomb
  • in the sarcophagus
  • in the mouth of the Sphinx

7. Who did not help the girl in the fairy tale "Geese-Swans" by Alexei Tolstoy?

  • stove
  • river
  • apple tree
  • swan geese

8. What building is not located on the Palace Square in St. Petersburg?

  • Winter Palace
  • Guards Corps Headquarters
  • Tauride Palace
  • Main Headquarters

9. What kind of footwear have been fashioned by surfers?

  • brogues
  • ugg boots
  • slip-ons
  • topsiders

10. What was planted in large quantities in 1942 on the football field of the Moscow Dynamo stadium?

  • tulips
  • ate
  • potatoes
  • corn

Unfortunately, the players answered the tenth question incorrectly and left the TV game "Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?" September 2, 2017 no winnings.

The construction of the stadium in Petrovsky Park began in 1923 according to the project of architects Alexander Langman and Leonid Cherikover, work proceeded at an accelerated pace and in 1928 the Dynamo stadium opened for the first All-Union Sports Games. The stadium originally had the shape of a horseshoe, but already in 1935 the East Stand was built, which enclosed the stadium. Since that time, the Dynamo stadium accommodated 54 thousand spectators and, until the opening of Luzhniki, remained the country's main arena. Today it is the oldest Moscow stadium.

"Dynamo" became the home arena of the eponymous Moscow football club, the first match of the Dynamo team at the new stadium took place on May 19, 1929. In the USSR, sport was an ideology, not an entertainment for the audience. Everyone, young and old, passed sports standards, preparing for labor and defense. The whole country knew the names of champions in different sports. Although Dynamo is primarily known as a football stadium, before the war, bicycle and motorcycle races, all-Union championships in athletics and speed skating, and bandy matches were held here.


Dynamo before reconstruction. 1934: https://pastvu.com/p/79123


The facade of the lobby of the Dynamo metro station is decorated with bas-reliefs depicting athletes and athletes


Box office pavilions of the stadium

During the Great Patriotic War, soldiers were trained at a carefully guarded stadium and detachments of OMSBON (a separate motorized rifle brigade of special purpose) were formed, which were then sent to the enemy rear. Shooters and snipers trained in the shooting range, and young fir trees were planted on the football field, probably in order to disguise themselves from air scouts.


"Dynamo". 1942-1944: https://pastvu.com/p/1765


"Dynamo". Celebrating the 800th anniversary of Moscow. 1947: https://pastvu.com/p/450639

On June 3, 1945, the first peacetime football match took place at the Dynamo Central Stadium. In the 1950s, football was out of competition, newsreels were preserved, how huge queues line up at the box office, how crowds of people besiege the stadium gates and how the overcrowded stands, watching the ups and downs of the match, react emotionally. Then a song appeared on the verses of Lev Oshanin: "But all Moscow stubbornly goes straight to Dynamo, forgetting about the rain ..."


"Dynamo". 1957: https://pastvu.com/p/65508

In 1964, an electronic light board was installed at the stadium. Before that, banners with the names of the teams were hung on information towers, and when goals were scored, giant match scores were manually changed.


"Dynamo". 1980: https://pastvu.com/p/802807

For the Moscow Olympics, all the old sports facilities were reconstructed, in particular, lighting masts appeared on the Dynamo, which made it possible to broadcast in color. Seven matches were played here as part of the Olympic-80 football tournament. At that time, spectators were seated on still wooden benches, plastic chairs appeared here in 1998, due to which the capacity of the stadium was sharply reduced.

The press box is a cult place, from here Vadim Sinyavsky and Nikolai Ozerov conducted their reports.

At the entrance to the North Stand in 1999, a monument was unveiled to the greatest goalkeeper Lev Yashin, who won fame in games for the USSR national team, and in club tournaments, who defended the colors of Moscow Dynamo.


Football commentator Vasily Utkin

To football

On November 22, 2008, a farewell match was held at the stadium (in a historic match, the capital's Dynamo played against Tomyu), and in 2009 a major reconstruction of the stadium began. Demolition of some buildings is planned, on the site of which two new sports complexes, offices, a hotel and a residential complex with class “A” apartments will be erected. Shopping areas will be located underground, and a sliding roof will allow Dynamo to hold concerts. After reconstruction, the arena's capacity will be 45,000 spectators. The author of the project is the Dutchman Eric van Egeraat and the Russian Mikhail Posokhin, the head of the Mosproject-2 institute. The total area of \u200b\u200bthe sports part will be more than 200 thousand square meters, and the total area of \u200b\u200bthe commercial area will be twice as large - over 450 thousand square meters. After the reconstruction, the stadium will bear the name "VTB Arena Central Stadium Dynamo" (construction work is carried out at the expense of investments of this bank).

Photos from 2008 show the Dynamo stadium immediately after the farewell match

Three years have passed. The lighting masts were dismantled, the stands were dismantled and the construction site came to a standstill. But in early February 2012, construction equipment came to the stadium again. According to the plan, already in 2016 the stadium should be ready to host football matches, and in 2018 the games of the World Cup will take place here.

History of Disastrous Military Intelligence Failures Hughes-Wilson John

6. BOLTLESS OPERATION. Dieppe (1942)

6. BOLTLESS OPERATION. Dieppe (1942)

On August 19, 1942, forces of the 2nd Canadian Division, based in Sussex, England, landed at Dieppe, a small port city on the northern coast of France. The landing was made just after sunrise with the participation of 30 new heavy infantry support tanks "Churchill". Five hours later, the defeated participants in the raid retreated, suffering heavy losses: out of 5,000 people who were part of the landing, 2,700 were killed, wounded or taken prisoner. Since only 4,000 fighters landed on the coast, this meant 60% losses, which exceeds the saddest "record" at that time, achieved on the first day of the Battle of the Somme in 1916. The Germans were amazed at the stupidity and folly of their opponents. One German commentator wrote: "This adventure was contrary to all the rules of military strategy and logic." The Dieppe operation was overgrown with numerous myths and secrets.

For a number of Canadian nationalists, Dieppe became one of the key myths according to which the brave Canadian soldiers were sent to certain death by cruel and incompetent British generals. In the eyes of the British public, it was a sacrificial political gesture aimed at convincing Stalin that the British Empire was indeed trying to take some of the burden off the USSR by opening a second front; conspiracy theorists regard Dieppe as nothing less than an insidious British conspiracy, the purpose of which was to prove to American strategists in Washington, who in 1942 did not know anything about European wars and demanded decisive action against the Nazis, that any premature offensive across the English Channel would inevitably end bloody defeat.

Each of these interpretations contains a grain of truth - but none is conclusive. For in one very important respect, Dieppe is unique: it was the only major offensive operation undertaken by the Imperial military without the official sanction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was the only major operational decision by the Allies in the entire Second World War not documented. This is the secret that gave rise to all the myths about Dieppe.

A careful analysis of the evidence gives every reason to believe that the Dieppe operation carried informal character and was carried out without the consent of the relevant authorities. The assault on Dieppe was undertaken without adequate resources, lack of intelligence on many key aspects of the German defense, and, finally, he did not have the full support of the British command, which was often kept in the dark or simply ignored. Worse, the developers of the operation did not fundamentally warn the official intelligence agencies about the impending landing and did not demand the necessary intelligence information from them. As a result, intelligence turned out to be the weakest point of the operation.

It may seem strange that a certain military leader ventured without an official order to storm the "fortress Europe" occupied by the Wehrmacht, but the personality, ambition, and track record of the person responsible for the Dieppe operation - Lord Mountbatten - were strange. In late 1941, Captain Lord Mount Betten was reassigned from command of a Royal Navy ship and appointed Chief of Joint Operations under Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the General Staff. By March 1942, Mountbatten had been promoted to three ranks, becoming the youngest vice admiral in the history of the British navy.

Mountbatten had three main points of pride. He proved to be a brave destroyer captain - his last three ships were incapacitated under circumstances that, according to his many critics, testified only to his recklessness and inexperience. Secondly, he was a specialist in self-promotion, presenting himself as a young and daring hero, capable of repelling the Germans and brightening up the bitterness of defeat for the British. Finally, Mountbatten had huge connections. A cousin of the King, a confidant of the Prime Minister, a personal friend of Noel Coward, able to easily enlist the support of both Hollywood friends and the British establishment, Mountbatten was a bright spot in the bleak military landscape of British life in early 1942. There was even talk among conservative politicians (almost certainly initiated by Mountbatten himself) that he should have been given powers that would elevate him over the other officers of the General Staff.

Behind the carefully cultivated legend of Mountbat Shadow was the unscrupulousness and ambition that often accompany great men and their success. He did not hesitate to deceive during naval exercises in order to distinguish himself from other officers, and deliberately withheld or falsified military documents after the war, when he felt that his carefully cultivated historical image was in danger. Even his official the biographer saw fit to mention that Ma-unbatten was inclined to "rewrite history with an arrogant indifference to facts."

Mountbatten's vanity knew no bounds. In the midst of hostilities, he could be seen posing for the camera on the set of Where We Serve, a hagiographic propaganda piece based on his personal experience, where his close friend Noel Coward played the dashing destroyer captain. Here is what Mountbatten wrote to Coward in this connection after the Dieppe raid: "Your letter caught me on my busiest day ... but since the matter ... is urgent, I will first solve it, and then take up my official duties." A normal commander in his place would visit the wounded and dying and listen to reports from the survivors.

Beaverbrook himself, knowing that Mountbatten does not tolerate any attacks on his own reputation, carefully created by himself, warned during the war: "Do not trust Mountbatten with any positions of responsibility." Despite Beaverbrook's warning, the young, unprincipled, vain, and ambitious aristocrat gained a seat on the country's highest military council, as well as the resources and power to attack the German-occupied coast of Europe. Mountbatten's character, combined with newfound power and ambition, led to tragic consequences.

The 1942 Dieppe raid had a historical predecessor: the 1918 St George's Day raid on Zeebrugge. Under the command of Admiral Roger Keyes of the Dover Patrol, a sabotage group of warships, marines and soldiers stormed the hangars of German submarines on the Belgian coast in a desperate attempt to prevent boats from the Kaiser's fleet out to sea. The raid was partly successful and, despite heavy losses, raised the British morale, shattered by the last German ground offensive in World War I. The Zeebrugge raid was touted as an example of a brilliant military operation that caused serious damage to the enemy at the cost of little blood - this kind of indirect attack has been a favorite technique of British strategists for many years.

In 1940, Keyes reappeared on the arena of hostilities, this time as Chief of Staff for Joint Operations, with the mission of attacking the victorious Germans on the shores of Europe and repeating his 1918 success. It is difficult to say what exactly pushed the British to attack the defended positions on the European coast - the Germans never felt the need to undertake such a military adventure on the British coast. Be that as it may, in 1940 the new Prime Minister Churchill decided that, despite the expulsion of British troops from the continent, it was necessary to continue the offensive strategy - not only with the aim of inflicting damage on the Germans, but also to cheer up the suffering population of occupied Europe, who in 1941 there was no other hope of liberation. Aside from aerial bombardments, the offensive was the only chance.

The combined operations headquarters was an unusual structure. It was an experimental headquarters for the coordination and planning of combat operations, created to combine the resources of the three branches of the armed forces. When in 1941 Mountbatten was replaced by Keyes on the direct orders of Winston Churchill, his task, according to Mountbatten himself, was “to continue the raids so brilliantly begun by Niz, to maintain the offensive spirit ... Second, to prepare for the invasion to Europe, without which we will never win this war. " In addition, according to Mountbatten, Churchill said: "I want you to turn the southern coast of England from a defensive bastion into a springboard for attack."

It was a head-spinning take-off for the recent 41-year-old ship captain, whose pinnacle of dreams was commanding one of the Royal Navy's new carriers. But Churchill, in his choice and appointment to the high office of the reckless Mountbatten, was guided primarily by political considerations: the Prime Minister wanted to demonstrate to the Americans, who had just entered the war and were skeptical of the combat potential of their ally, the offensive spirit of the British troops. After the defeats in Norway, France, near Dunkirk, Greece, Crete, Malaya and Singapore, after Rommel's victories in North Africa culminating in the surrender of Tobruk in June 1942, the Americans had every reason to assess the combat effectiveness of the British army low. Even Churchill could not understand why surrender follows surrender, often repeating bitterly: "Why don't our soldiers want to fight?"

Churchill made a good choice. Realizing the charm of Mountbatten, his good looks, remembering the impression a desperate grunt what he produced for the Roosevelts, especially Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, the cunning prime minister understood that if anyone could convince high-ranking American politicians of the fortress of the British morale, it was Mountbatten. During his visits to Washington, the new Combined Operations Commander won the hearts of all the Americans he met, including the living personification of Republican military prowess and America's greatest soldier, General George W. Marshall, who became his personal friend. The young hero did a great job in the field of diplomatic "PR", this time using his brilliant abilities not only for his own benefit, but also in the interests of his compatriots. Churchill was justly proud of his protégé. Mountbatten himself seemed to be well aware of Churchill's true intentions, boasting to one of his friends: "Winston told me what he wants, and now I must put his plans into practice." With such powerful support, even the most humble person would have found it difficult not to acquire megalomania, and Mountbatten never suffered from excessive modesty. According to the Canadian historian and specialist in Dieppe, Professor Brian Loring Willa, "if Mountbatten's head dizzy, then Churchill was most to blame." You can even view Mountbatten as sacrifice the indiscriminate Churchill, who played on the weaknesses of the young admiral for his own purposes.

After Kees left, Mountbatten wasted no time in putting things in order at the Joint Operations Headquarters and at the same time reaping the benefits of his predecessor's successes. The headquarters were bathed in glory thanks to successful raids on the Norwegian islands of Vogsøy and the first combat distinction of the Parachute Regiment - the daring kidnapping of a German radar installation from the city of Brunewal in northern France. Even the raid on Saint-Nazaire on March 27, 1942, despite the losses, was considered successful (five recipients of the Victoria Cross), since during it a huge dry dock was destroyed (the only one capable of servicing German warships in the Atlantic), which decided one of the great strategic problems for the British. All these operations were developed by the headquarters at the time when Keyes was in charge.

New plans by Mountbatten's Joint Operations Headquarters for 1942 included a vast array of attacks, from the temporary capture of Alderney, one of the Channel Islands in the English Channel, to a reckless raid on the Gestapo headquarters in Paris. The crown number was supposed to be the raid on Dieppe in June, codenamed "Lautia" (Rutter). The goals of the Dieppe operation, despite later claims that it was an unsuccessful attempt at a large-scale invasion of Europe or some kind of deceitful maneuver to disorient the Germans and support the French Resistance fighters, were in fact the following: to check whether it was possible to capture and hold a major port in for a limited period of time; obtain intelligence from prisoners, as well as seize documents and equipment; to assess the reaction of the Germans to a major "false" attack on the French coast.

In addition to these purely military objectives, three others, less clearly defined, were set. First: the Air Force headquarters wanted to engage the Luftwaffe in the West in a large-scale air battle and inflict serious damage on the German air force based in France; the second, purely political goal: to demonstrate to the USSR that Britain is determined to take the Germans by the throat; the third, and the most obscure of all: the desire of the Canadian government to become more involved in the war.

The first of them later played into the hands of Mount Betgen. Although the Royal Navy and the Army were wary of providing too much force for Operation Launch, Air Force Chief of Staff Marshal Portal was keenly interested in demonstrating the power of a rapidly expanding fleet of fighters in 1942 and engaging the German Air Force in the hopes of inflicting a crushing defeat on the Germans. ... Actions to destroy ground targets in a port located close to airfields in southern England were supposed to "provoke a response from the Luftwaffe." As a result, the British Air Force became staunch supporters of the plan, while the other two branches of the armed forces reacted rather coolly to it.

Churchill's political difficulties in the spring and summer of 1942 were largely associated with his support for Operation Lotsiya in particular and the activities of the Joint Operations Headquarters in general. Any British victory in the West would be an important trump card in the complex political game between the Allies. The need for decisive action became even more obvious after Stalin's speech in February 1942, in which he dropped an indirect allusion to the possibility of concluding a separate peace with Hitler. From the point of view of the seriously alarmed British Foreign Office, this speech could be either the first step towards a truce, or an attempt to shift a significant part of the burden of the war onto the shoulders of the British in order to ease the burden of the Russians. In any case, it was necessary to convince the USSR that Great Britain was determined to fight. Large-scale offensive actions in the West would confirm this determination, regardless of their outcome.

Summer began under the sign of unfortunate defeats in the desert and British dissatisfaction with the actions of their prime minister. Churchill became increasingly depressed and desperate for success - any success. With the fall of Tobruk on June 21, 1942, the political volcano in Westminster and Whitehall threw up a lava of discontent with Churchill's leadership in wartime, with the Prime Minister and his government receiving fierce criticism in political circles and the press. A vote of no confidence was voted in the House of Commons, and although its outcome (clearly orchestrated) was in favor of Churchill (475 votes to 25), the Prime Minister experienced a tremendous shock. He later admitted that "the only thing he always feared was the House of Commons in the midst of a debate."

To survive as a politician, Churchill needed military success. And he knew it. Now he had to wage a political struggle not only with the Germans and his strategic allies Roosevelt and Stalin, but also with the skeptical parliament and Whitehall. The cautious and pragmatic chiefs of staff considered most of his military adventures premature, content with a gradual build-up of British military power. The politician Churchill, who understood perfectly well that in a democracy one should please the crowd, needed some kind of momentary success. Only bomber aircraft led by the cocky Harris and the Joint Operations Headquarters led by the desperate Lord Louis Mountbatten shared his values \u200b\u200band were ready to face off against the enemy in the summer of 1942.

The third target of Operation Launch was the least practical of all. It consisted in the desire of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, after two and a half years of inactivity, to take part in the battles. From the outset of the war, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King has publicly expressed strong support for Canada's entry into the war, but has been slow to send her troops to the front. Given the aggressiveness and traditionally high morale of Canadians, such a policy was inevitably doomed to failure. Despite the fact that thousands of Canadians signed up to volunteer, Mackenzie King realized that conscription into the army to serve overseas would lead to political problems, especially in French-speaking Canada, and did everything to keep Canada's participation in the front lines to a minimum.

Divisions intensified among politicians in Ottawa. Having created a large, highly trained and equipped army and sent it to the English county of Sussex to prepare for battle, Canadian politicians found that their war machine began to work on its own. The commanders of the Canadian Expeditionary Force in England, McNaughton, Creerar and Roberts, tired of two years of inaction, looked for an opportunity to take a more active part in the war, if only to give their bored soldiers something to do. As usual, boredom manifested itself in a fall in discipline. Canadians stole, got drunk, fought and engaged in promiscuous sex, which is quite natural for any large group of healthy young people who find themselves far from home and do not know what to do, but surrounded by many available single women.

The Canadian propaganda machine tried in vain to reassure the public that the crime rate in the Canadian army was no higher than in others. By August 1942, 3,238 Canadian soldiers in Sussex had been tribunalized, and the locals fed up with their antics hoped the fighting would soon turn the attention of their overly perky guests to other things. Lord Woof-Woof scoffed from Berlin: “If you want to occupy Berlin, give every Canadian soldier a motorcycle and a bottle of whiskey. Then declare Berlin closed. The Canadian soldiers will be there in 48 hours and the war will be over. " In 1942, the Canadian army in Great Britain was the most trained, but the least of all fighting. The Canadians and their commanders were eager to fight. When Lieutenant General Harry Krirar, commander of the 1st Canadian Corps, was summoned to the headquarters of Montgomery, Chief of the Southeast Command, on April 27, 1942, he was asked if Canadian soldiers were ready to take part in a major raid on the French coast. The answer was short: "You bet!"

On May 13, 1942, the Chiefs of Staff approved the plan for Operation Lotsiya. The plan envisaged a frontal offensive along the entire coast of Dieppe, supported by flanking attacks by commandos in order to destroy the coastal batteries that covered the approaches to the port. A thousand sorties were planned to take control of airspace and ensure complete air superiority. The navy was supposed to shell the city from the coastal zone. The Lotsiya plan was not successful. In the final stages of planning, the attacking forces had to be significantly reduced, since the fleet refused to provide battleships and other large vessels for fire support, and the Air Force, in order to avoid losses among French civilians, reduced plans for an intensive bombing of the Dieppe coastline to a series of fighter-bomber air raids and attacks from low level flight. The 2nd Canadian Division was to lead the attack and temporarily capture the radar station and airfield in the city of Ark, five kilometers from the coast.

On July 5 and 6, Canadian troops boarded the landing craft, but the weather began to turn bad and they were ordered to remain at anchor. While the soldiers were seasick in the cramped landing barges, two German bombers appeared in the skies over the Isle of Wight and bombarded the flotilla without significant results. The strong wind over the English Channel did not abate, and on July 7 the operation was canceled, and the soldiers landed on the beach, flooding the pubs and streets of the cities of southern England, where they talked about the failed raid and the horrors they experienced in the cramped landing barges during the storm. Everyone believed that the Dieppe operation had failed and now would never take place.

It looked like the truth. Neither the commander of the army, Montgomery, nor the commander of the fleet at Portsmouth, Sir William James, believed in the feasibility of the plan. The further the development of Operation Lotsiya progressed, the more their fears became. Montgomery, as commander of the army, did not like the very idea of \u200b\u200ba frontal offensive by infantry without proper bombing by air force planes in order to weaken the enemy, and the head of bomber aviation was not ready to conduct such an operation. Bernard Lowe Montgomery fought in World War I and understood perfectly well that a poorly prepared frontal offensive without proper fire support was doomed to failure.

In turn, the commander of the Royal Navy in Portsmouth and the admiral, who was at the head of the amphibious forces, well remembered the fate of the British Navy ships Prince of Wales and Ripalo, sunk six months ago in Malaya. They were not going to risk their battleships by allowing them to come more than five miles to the enemy-occupied coast, where they could easily be bombed by the German Air Force. First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Dudley Pound was in complete agreement with them. The professional military understood that the Dieppe raid was poorly thought out, lacked adequate fire support, and was not coordinated. Now that the operation had failed, they all breathed a sigh of relief.

What followed the cancellation of Operation Launch was the beginning of the Dieppe mystery. The cancellation of a long-cherished plan has drawn public attention to its developers. Taking on the fire of criticism both for the overly inflated structure of the Joint Operations Headquarters and for the "slapdash" planning of Operation Litzia, Mountbatten decided to act independently: on July 8 and 11 he held meetings of the main headquarters involved in planning the initial operation, and turned to them for support in organizing a new raid. However, he was refused.

During the second meeting, on July 11, Mountbatten quietly asked several of his supporters to stay after the main critics of his plan (such as Rear Admiral Bailey-Grohmann, who had been appointed commander of the fleet for Operation Launch) left the premises. No one knows exactly what happened at the ensuing closed meeting, but after that Mountbatten and his senior staff officer, Navy Captain John Hughes-Hallett, immediately set about designing a new operation to replace Lautia. It will be called "Jubilee", and Dieppe will again become its target.

Any major operation involving an attack on the European continent required the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. July saw one of the most curious episodes in the history of World War II: the Chief of Staff for Joint Operations, a protégé of the Prime Minister and media darling Lord Louis Mountbatten set out to fool the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the apparatus that coordinated the activities of intelligence services in charge of armed forces and most of the officers of their own headquarters. Mountbatten decided to launch a new attack on Dieppe under a different name and without official approval from his superiors. In his declining years in a little-known television interview Air force In 1972, he noted: "I made an unusual and, I think, very daring decision - to try again to storm Dieppe."

Even Captain Hughes-Hallett, the closest officer to Mountbatten and a staunch supporter of his plan for a new attack on Dieppe, was troubled by the lack of approval from above. He emphasized that, as a senior officer of the Joint Operations Headquarters, he would need to refer to the instructions of some official authority in all staff documents and written requests. In this regard, on July 17, the Chief of Staff of Joint Operations sent an official request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the adoption of the following resolution: "The Chief of Staff of Joint Operations is instructed to organize a new urgent operation to replace the Lotsi ... using the same troops." The chiefs of staff doubted, and the resolution was not included in the minutes of the meeting.

Mountbatten grew impatient. On July 25 and 26, he sent new requests to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, this time asking for unrestricted authority to conduct large-scale raids without the need to specify the objectives of the attacks each time. Jealous of Mount Betten's rapid rise and privileged access to the top, extremely suspicious of his ambitions and motives, the chiefs of staff did not go to meet him. On July 27, they passed a resolution that slightly expanded his planning powers, but at the same time emphasized the need to obtain official permission to organize any new operation.

Mountbatten did not expect more. He was glad to have the opportunity to do something and ordered Captain Hughes-Hallett and several trusted officers of his headquarters to get down to business immediately. It is unknown what he told Hughes-Hallett, but there is little doubt that he deceived him. Perhaps he presented the case in such a way that the July 27 resolution expanding his planning powers actually implied the consent of the chiefs of staff to develop a new plan called "Jubilee." Hughes-Hallett was his staunch ally and truly believed in everything his charismatic boss said, who was in close contact with prime ministers, movie stars and chiefs of staff. For a senior staff officer, such an attitude towards his superior was quite natural.

On July 28, for the information of a limited circle of officers of the Joint Operations Headquarters, an order was issued to resume Operation Lotsiya under the leadership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and under the code name Jubilee. On July 31, the headquarters of the sabotage forces received new operational orders, and all the parties involved urgently began planning a second operation. On 12 August, the Chiefs of Staff gave their consent to planninga new raid instead of the canceled "Pilot". Dieppe was not mentioned or discussed as the target of the operation.

For the rest of his days, Mountbatten referred to these most generalized decisions to give the impression that his second raid on Dieppe had been officially approved. However, neither the testimonies of his colleagues in the committee of chiefs of staff, nor the documents of the cabinet of ministers say a word in favor of this version. Even Churchill could not remember the decisions regarding the raid on Dieppe when he was working on his own work on the history of the war - the book "The Loop of Fate" - in 1950. In the end, seeing no other way out, he accepted Mountbatten's interpretation and took responsibility for himself, but we know from his correspondence that Churchill did so only because neither he nor anyone else could find any government documents , which would testify to the opposite.

The truth is that there was simply no specific approval of a new attack on Dieppe, and Mountbatten was well aware of this. He solved the problem with the troops, advising the Canadian military leaders to keep the details of the new operation secret "in the interests of security." A limited number of staff officers began planning Operation Jubilee in the strictest secrecy. But not everyone was informed. Under the pretext of "security" (this priceless mantra of the military trying to hide the unpleasant truth), several key departments were deliberately kept in the dark. The recalcitrant Fleet Admiral Bailey-Grohmann was not included in the initiates, and Captain Hughes-Hallett took over his duties at Mountbatten's request. Bypassing Montgomery's headquarters, Mauntbatten secretly maintained contact directly with the top commanders of the Canadian army. Most dangerous of all, the new plan for the raid on Dieppe was not communicated to Mountbatten's chief of staff, the senior intelligence officer, or his official deputy, Major General Haydon. In the commercial realm, this would be tantamount to having the chairman of the UK branch of the company Ford decided to build a new car model in the UK and would not notify the company's US headquarters, the company's director of sales and marketing, or its CFO. How Mountbatten was going to get out of this situation is anyone's guess. Most likely, he was betting on the success of the raid, knowing that "the winners are not judged."

The real danger to the resumed operation lay in the area of \u200b\u200bintelligence. Although the measures for the material and technical support of any impending military operation cannot be kept secret for a long time, it is far from always possible to determine by them locationoperations. When it comes to information support, the secret inevitably comes to light: Mountbeth tenu needed maps, plans, photographs and other information about Dieppe. Mountbatten's secret plans were in two dangers: he had to keep his revised operational plan secret, not only from the Germans, but, if possible, from the committee of chiefs of staff. The task seemed almost impossible, but Mountbatten needed intelligence - a lot of intelligence - to launch a successful offensive on a secure port in occupied Europe.

The British have shown prowess over the years in leading and coordinating intelligence operations at the highest level. Learning from their mistakes and experience, by the end of 1941, they had perfected the fundamental principle: all operations to notify the Interdepartmental Security Council (Inter-Services Security Board - ISSB). The purpose of this bureaucratic measure was simple, but extremely important: ISSB was the focal point of actions to mislead the enemy and, in particular, coordinated the activities LCS - the British Secret Service, the activities of which are described in Chapter 2. In addition, ISSB ensured the safety of operations: only in it they knew which of the secrets that were leaked to the Germans during various counterintelligence and diversion operations were genuine, and which were fake, only in it they could assess the overall degree of risk that threatened the security of a particular operation.

Mountbatten chose not to inform the Inter-Agency Security Council about Operation Jubilee. The official work "British Intelligence during the Second World War" does not say a word about this. Moreover, Mountbatten did not seek help from any of the leading intelligence organizations such as the Secret Intelligence Service (SJS), relying on intelligence gathered for Operation Launch. He updated this basic information with a series of low-level reconnaissance missions assigned to tactical aerial photo reconnaissance squads and dedicated small liaison units that could be contacted directly without having to answer awkward questions.

This neglect of intelligence was fraught with serious dangers. First, Mountbatten risked being left without the freshest intelligence after his troops landed. Secondly, he was deprived of the opportunity to find out how the Germans were aware of his plans. Dieppe had by then been seriously discredited as a target. Six thousand soldiers have spoken of the Lautia raid across southern England, canceled on 7 July, since the day they disembarked from the landing craft. Who could forbid them? For them, it was already history. Everything connected with the raid on Dieppe has long ceased to be a secret. And to top all the trouble LCS(of which Mountbatten knew almost nothing) was busy transmitting carefully selected bits of information about old raid on Dieppe to his "colleagues" from the German intelligence services. With the cancellation of Lotsiya it was possible to safely supply the enemy with more or less valuable information about this operation in order to increase his confidence in the agents МІ5, embedded in the Abwehr.

Disinformation operation of German intelligence carried out by the British committee "Double Cross" using recruited agents МІ5, in the summer of 1942 bore fruit. The German intelligence service received at least four warnings about the Dieppe raid from their alleged agents in the UK. Thus, the Germans were perfectly informed. To such an extent that some commentators in all seriousness believed that the second Dieppe operation was a fraudulent maneuver, undertaken at the cost of a lot of blood for the sole purpose of strengthening the reputation of the agents МІ5 in the Abwehr. This version is clearly far-fetched. The most likely explanation is that the Interdepartmental Security Council gave permission for the transfer of minor secrets to the Abwehr after the cancellation of the Lotsi. The only problem was that the secrets weren't insignificant: Dieppe did intend to attack, but Mount Betten chose not to inform the Inter-Agency Security Council of the resumption of the operation. Mountbatgen's troops were at great risk.

As is often the case in war, everything was decided by chance - the German intelligence service in Paris did not convey their warnings to the troops defending Dieppe. Although a training alert was issued on the French coast on 17 and 18 August 1942, and Hitler and the commander of German forces in the West, von Rundstedt, warned of possible raids on the French coast, there is no evidence that this was all related to a specific attack in the area. Dieppe. There is no evidence that the Germans received reinforcements and prepared an ambush for the Canadians. But neither Mountbatgen's intelligence nor the Canadians' intelligence knew this. Mountbatten was lucky.

The reconnaissance tasks in preparation for Operation Jubilee were relatively simple. For an attack on a defended coast, operational headquarters must have four types of information: topography of the battlefield (steepness of the coastline, direction of currents, etc.); data on the number and deployment of enemy troops; data on tools, their location and potential; and finally, information about the plans of the enemy's response actions - to fight, wait for reinforcements, or retreat.

In theory, all this seems easy, but obtaining such information requires access to the entire "pantheon" of intelligence sources and agencies. For example, information about the coastal strip can be found in books published before the war, but since time and tides inevitably make their own adjustments, it is important that scout divers carefully recheck the topography of the coast as close as possible to the beginning of the raid. Information about the number, disposition and morale of the enemy can be collected piece by piece using aerial photographic reconnaissance, agent reports, electronic intelligence, and from publicly available sources. It is more difficult to collect information about the guns and ammunition depots of the enemy: after identifying their location by means of aerial photographic reconnaissance, information from local agents or prisoners of war or electronic intelligence data is required to specify the images obtained. Finally, the enemy's plans and intentions can only be learned from agent messages, captured documents and electronic intelligence data.

The fact is that in order to conduct a successful operation on such a scale as the Dieppe Raid, the entire huge arsenal of information gathering tools at the disposal of British intelligence was needed. He was available and could provide answers to any questions, but if Mountbatten turned to the Joint Intelligence Committee for full information support of the raid (Joint Intelligence Committee - JIC) Britain, he would certainly have alerted the Cabinet Office and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of his intention to resume the raid, and they would have stopped him. Therefore, deciding to bypass the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Mountbatten was forced to bypass the intelligence agencies.

Ignoring the intelligence community, Mountbatten risked leaving his troops in the dark about vital information. The fact that he did not use all available intelligence sources resulted in senseless losses. Here are two simple but convincing examples: the coast at Dieppe was too steep and rocky for tanks with lightweight tracks; secondly, artillery pieces were hidden in the coastal grottoes. On the day of the operation, ignorance of these two facts would have killed many Canadians. Both problems could easily be solved by the Joint Intelligence Committee with the intelligence at its disposal, but Mountbatten did not dare to seek help from an outside superior agency. He wanted to keep his desire for personal glory a secret.

Several other intelligence errors at Dieppe border on farce. According to data obtained by the intelligence department of the Joint Operations Headquarters - and by military intelligence - the Dieppe area was defended by the 110th Wehrmacht Division. Of course, the soldiers of the 110th Division would have been glad to be there, but that was impossible: in those days they wearily wandered across Russia almost four thousand kilometers from the scene, pursuing Soviet soldiers retreating to the east in the endless steppe.

In fact, the military unit, enjoying delicious wine and French girls in Dieppe, was the 571st Infantry Regiment of the 302nd Division, a second category division composed mostly of Poles and middle-aged ethnic Germans and equipped with a motley mix of horses, motorcycles, trophy Czech and French weapons and other ammunition, which the commissary service at the headquarters of the western group of German forces in Paris was able to beg from Berlin. Lacking weapons, ammunition and trained manpower, the commander of the 302nd division wisely decided to focus his resources on covering the most likely enemy offensive site: the rocky coast at Dieppe. Equally prudent was his order not to place the guns in prepared firing positions, where they could be seen and attacked from the air. Scouring the coast during tactical reconnaissance flights on the instructions of the Joint Operations Headquarters, the pilots would not have been able to look inside the grottoes in the coastal cliffs of Dieppe. The wisdom of Major General Konrad Haase's simple yet effective defensive plan became apparent to the defenders as flanking fire from assorted guns hidden in grottoes and a captured French tank embedded in a dam began to mow down Canadians as they climbed the steep rocky slope.

Because Mountbatten neglected the services SIS and agent networks of the Special Operations Directorate (Special Operations Executive - SOE) during France, his headquarters decided to use the services of electronic intelligence - if not at the strategic (in this case, he would have to deal with the Joint Intelligence Committee), then at least at the tactical level. This measure was supported by the experience gained during the spring raid on Saint-Nazaire. If the operational group of the headquarters could hear how the enemy reacts and what orders the enemy receives directly during the battle, the military commanders of the Joint Operations Headquarters could act "with open eyes." This clever tactic worked far better during the raid on Saint-Nazaire than anyone in Chidla (the headquarters of the radio interception service) could have imagined. Ironically, during the Dieppe operation, the airwaves were overwhelmed with information, and the radio interception service of the Joint Operations Headquarters simply did not cope with the timely transmission of data to the aviation commander during the battle. However, the idea itself was reasonable.

As the day of the attack approached, concern grew for the success of Operation Jubilee and its secrecy. Secrecy was a major concern; after the cancellation of the first attack, it might have seemed pointless, but several cases of information leaks and loss of documents have heightened the need to keep preparations for the operation secret - at least from the Joint Intelligence Committee. Even the enthusiastic Canadians doubted. The infantry division commander, Major General Roberts, was alarmed by the whole plan, but cheerful assurances from Mountbatten and the staff of the Joint Operations Headquarters partly reassured him. After all, he reasoned, they were experienced staff officers, not my match. His concern, however, was shared by many Canadians.

Captain Austin Stanton, adjutant of the Calgary Panzer Regiment, admitted: "In my opinion, the operation had no chance." He was so pessimistic that on the day of the operation he dressed in new clothes in case he was taken prisoner, which greatly angered his commander. Be that as it may, on the night of August 18, the Calgary Panzer Regiment embarked on a new 60-meter tank landing ship (TDK) in Newhaven in full view of the silent crowd of civilians. “There was an eerie silence when we stood in line outside the docks,” Stanton recalled. Along with 4,963 other participants in Operation Jubilee, who embarked on 237 ships, the alarmed adjutant of a Canadian tank regiment sailed towards the battle.

The attack did not go well from the start. The German navy carried out regular patrols, during which the supervision of commercial maritime traffic along the French coastline was ensured. This fact, including the schedule of patrol convoys, was well known in Dover and Portsmouth, where coastal surface targeting radars were located. However, more accurate information about the convoys was kept secret at the request of senior management, as it came from confidential strategic sources such as the Enigma message decryption team. No one from Mountbatgen's intelligence headquarters requested details of German movements in the Channel on 18 and 19 August. To make such a request would be to inform the Joint Intelligence Committee and with it the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the operation.

The result was predictable. In the early morning of 19 August, as ships carrying 3rd battalion commandos approached the cliffs at Belleville and Berneval east of Dieppe, their escort stumbled upon a German coastal convoy in the dark. Despite two clear signals sent at 01.27 and 02.44 by Royal Navy radars from England to the commander aboard the destroyer Culp with the exact coordinates of the German convoy, the warning did not reach the escort on the eastern flank. The Joint Operations Headquarters plan began to falter from the first steps.

The participants in Operation Jubilee learned about the German convoy only when a shell of light flashed over their heads and in its cold, false light, the German escort opened fire, knocking out gunboat No. 5, which provided direct cover for the landing ships on the eastern flank. As the other Royal Navy escorts approached, a fierce exchange of fire began with tracer shells flying in all directions "like fireworks." As a result, the Germans were forced to retreat with heavy losses. Operation Jubilee lost its element of surprise. At dawn, the ships of the eastern flank, with the paratroopers on board, who did not have time to recover from the surprise, approached the shore in anxious silence. According to one of the sergeants of the 3rd Commando Battalion, "through binoculars, you could see the damned Germans watching through their binoculars as we land on the beach."

With the first rays of the sun, several attacks began at once. To the east, on the left flank, the 3rd commando battalion, led by the formidable Peter Young (who watched the night skirmish from its very epicenter), overcame the barbed wire barriers, “with which the Hans carefully entangled the entire cliff - probably to make it easier for us ascend, "and conducted a successful attack that silenced the Goebbels artillery battery. By noon, Young was back in New Haven in his field uniform torn to shreds and his hands torn to pieces. On the far western flank at Varengeville, the disciplined 4th Commando Battalion, under Lord Lovat, destroyed the guns of the Hess Battery in an exemplary double-sweep maneuver.

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The Japanese name for Japan, Nihon (日本), has two parts, ni (日) and hon (本), both of which are Sinic. The first word (日) in modern Chinese is pronounced rì and, as in Japanese, denotes “sun” (written in its ideogram). The second word (本) in modern Chinese is pronounced bӗn. Its original meaning is "root", and the ideogram conveying it is the ideogram of the tree mù (木) with a dash added at the bottom denoting the root. From the meaning “root” the meaning “origin” developed, and it was in this meaning that it entered the name of Japan Nihon (日本) - “origin of the sun”\u003e “land of the rising sun” (modern Chinese rì bӗn). In ancient Chinese, the word bӗn (本) also had the meaning of “scroll, book”. In modern Chinese, it is supplanted in this sense by the word shū (書), but remains in it as a counting word for books. The Chinese word bӗn (本) has been borrowed into Japanese for both root, origin and scroll, book, and hon (本) means book in modern Japanese as well. The same Chinese word bӗn (本) in the meaning of “scroll, book” was also borrowed into the ancient Türkic language, where, after adding the Türkic suffix -ig to it, it acquired the form * küjnig. The Türks brought this word to Europe, where it, from the language of the Danube Türkic-speaking Bulgars in the form of K'nig, got into the language of the Slavic-speaking Bulgarians and through the Church Slavonic it spread to other Slavic languages, including Russian.

Thus, the Russian word book and the Japanese word hon “book” have a common root of Chinese origin, and the same root is included as a second component in the Japanese name of Japan Nihon.

I hope everything is clear?)))